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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONNA CHARLENE HADDEN and ) 




FARR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 





Case No. 16811 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Plaintiff/Appellants, hereinafter referred to as 
Plaintiff, seek damages from the Defendant/Respondents, 
hereinafter referred to as Defendant, for interference with 
certain claimed water rights in a spring located on Defendant's 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable John F. Walquist of the District Court of 
Weber County held a pre-trial conference the morning of trial 
and requested each side to state what evidence they were 
capable of producing. Upon hearing the evidence of the 
Plaintiff, the Judge ruled that even if they were able to 
prove all that they alleged, they would be unable to maintain 
a cause of action, and the Court, therefore, dismissed 
Plaintiff's Complaint. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the decision of the District 
Court of Weber County upheld and sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The morning of the trial, in a pre-trial conference, 
the Court requested each side through their attorneys to 
state the facts and anticipated proof. The facts stated by 
the Plaintiff are those that the Court determined as 
Findings of Fact in the Court's Memorandum Decision which 
in essence are: 
1. The case involves a dispute over water rights to 
a spring that formerly existed on ground just north of the 
Hill Air Force Base plateau. 
2. The property passed under the ownership of the 
Ritter family, who evidently in the 1920's developed a 
spring in the area and about the year 1935 install~d a 
collection box to gather water for the spring. 
3. During the 1940's, the Ritter family alienated 
a portion of the ground containing the spring. Ultimately, 
this portion of the ground containing the spring was 
purchased by the Defendant. 
4. Another portion of the property ultimately came 
into the hands of the Plaintiff. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. 
The Trial Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action upon which relief may be granted. The Court, in 
pre-trial conference, asked each side what facts they were 
going to be able to prove at trial. The Plaintiff admitted 
to their attorney that they would be unable to provide any 
evidence that would show use of a water right prior to 1903. 
Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint indicates, at best, 
that 1909 is the first possible year of any water usage. 
Plaintiff further indicated through affidavit of Bernice Bills 
that she had childhood recollections dating to about the year 
1920 for use of the water in question. The Findings of Fact 
entered for purpose of Defendant's motion to dismiss all 
come from the allegations contained on the face of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, and the 
representations of Plaintiff's counsel. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS SEEK TO FIND AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL 
RULE THAT WATER RIGHTS MUST BE ACQUIRED BY APPROPRIATION 
AND FILING WITH THE STATE ENGINEER'S OFFICE. 
Plaintiff's admit in their brief that to prevail they 
must prove an exception to the general rule as enunciated 
in the 1903 statute which is correctly quoted in Plaintiff's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The water of all streams and other sources in 
~he state, that.are flowing above or under the ground 
in known or defined channels, is hereby declared to 
be the property of the public, subject to all 
existing rights to the use thereof. 
The Plaintiffs in Point II of their brief assert that 
an exception to the general rule exists for percolating 
waters. Case law has established three different kinds of 
underground water: 
1. Waters that are part of definite underground 
channels. 
2. Waters that are part of the underflow or support 
flow of a surface stream. 
3. Percolating waters. 
Deseret Livestock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P 479; 
Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Brigham Young University 
Legal Studies, J. Reuben Clark Law- School, Volume 2, Page 635. · 
The first two categories on definite underground channels 
and those waters that make up the support or underflow of 
surf ace streams are clearly not at issue in this case and 
were clearly handled by the 1903 law. The Plaintiff relies 
on the case of Peterson v. Eureka Hill Mining Company, 53 
Utah 70, 176 Pac. 729, and its statement: 
Where a mining company has appropriated the 
waters of a spring located on. the public domain and 
has subsequently acquired title to the premises, 
another cannot over the owner's protest, acquire any 
rights to such waters by making application to the 
State Engineer's office. 
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Two elements become crucial to this exception enunciated by 
the Utah Court: 
1. The spring be initially located on the public 
domain and user of the spring subsequently acquires owner-
ship to the land; and 
2. The water does not flow below the tract of land 
whereon the same is located. 
It is clear that we are not dealing with this kind 
of exception as outlined in Peterson. Plaintiffs have 
admitted in their Interrogatories and in their representations 
to the Court that this land has not been in the public 
domain since well before 1903. The facts enunciated in this 
case by Plaintiff's counsel as contained in Plaintiff's 
Complaint further fail the second element of the exception 
in that they have affirmatively alleged that the water from 
the spring ran through a pipe below the property whereon the 
spring is located. It is also essential to note that the 
Plaintiffs have never at any time owned or claimed ownership 
of the ground upon which the spring is located. 
The general law in Utah from 1925 on this subject is 
contained in Hooppiania. The Court is clear in its statement 
that the manner prescribed by the 1903 law of appropriating 
and filing with the State Engineer was the exclusive way of 
determining water rights. 
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Plaintiffs also rely on the case of Wrathall v. 
Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755. The Wrathall decision 
is not a clear basis to establish authority. Justice 
Moffat in his main opinion seems to be attempting to 
overrule Hooppiania, however, Justice Moffat is unable to 
secure a majority of the Court to agree on anything but 
the result of remanding the case back to the District Court 
for trial. Both of the concurring decisions should be 
read for their limitation on Justice Moffat's attempted 
overturning of the Hooppiania decision. Even if the full 
implication of Justice Moffat's words are taken literally 
the net result of his decision is "a landowner under whose 
land there exists a source of supply may draw therefrom 
the full supply of his needs as long as no prior appropriators 
supplies appreciably or sensibly diminish." 40 P. 2d at 774. 
The legislature took the impact of Justice Moffat's decision 
to mean that artesian wells, basins, and wells in general 
were now to be called percolating water, and therefore not 
subject to the statute requiring appropriation and regis-
tration through the State Engineer's office and that 
appropriation may not be the exclusive means of appropriating 
waters from wells. The legislature which was in session at 
the time of Justice Moffat' s decision immediately passed the 
1935 law declaring all water, whether subterrain or surface, 
to be subject to requirements of appropriation and regis-
tration through the State Engineer's office. 
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In any event, even if Justice Moffat's decision is 
given full impact, the facts proferred by the Plaintiffs 
do not constitute a cause of action under Wrathall. That 
situation alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint is simply a 
spring on another property owner's land with a pipe running 
from the spring off the other party's ground and unto 
Plaintiff's ground, which is a far cry from the fact 
situation in Wrathall. 
The facts proferred by Plaintiff in no way fit either 
Justice Moffat's definition of percolation or the more 
standard definitions of percolation enunciated by the Utah 
Court. The definitions of percolation that have been 
adopted.by the Utah Court are reflective of a state of 
geology and hydrology of the time that they are made. The 
Court has given an excellent discussion and critique of 
percolating waters in Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P. 2d 922, 
924 ff. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS ARE CORRECT IN ESTABLISHING AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE LAW OF APPROPRIATION, ANY WATER 
RIGHTS IN THE SPRING HAVE LONG SINCE BEEN CONVEYED 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Even if Plaintiffs are correct, and this particular 
spring does fall within the meaning of percolating water, 
Plaintiff's predecessors in interest long ago conveyed 
away any right to the water. 
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Until 1935, the decisions of this Court created 
the waters of artesian basins as percolating waters 
and such the ownership went with the owner of the 
ground where such waters were located and were not 
considered to be the subject of appropriation. 
(Riordan Supra, 203 P. 2d at 925.) 
It is clear that if Plaintiff's predecessor in interest did 
in fact establish a water right in an artesian basin as in 
this particular spring, when Plaintiff's predecessor in 
interest divided the land and sold the spring, he sold 
right to the waters. Plaintiffs have not asserted nor 
nor offered any evidence of a reservation of any kind. 
the J 
proferrl 
Subsequent to 1935, artesian basins have not been 
considered percolating waters placing them outside of the 
reach of the statute and necessity of appropriation and 
filing through the State Engineer's office. Riordan Supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Cou+t was correct in taking the facts as 
proferred by Plaintiff's counsel at the pre-trial hearing 
based upon Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff's affidavits, 
and·Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, and accepting 
them as true for purposes of Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff's asserted facts do not create an exception 
to the general rule that water rights are acquired in Utah 
by appropriation and filing with the State Engineer's office. 
Even if everything that Plaintiff says is taken as 
true and a water right was created in Plaintiff's predecessor 
I 
I 
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in interest, that water right was sold and ultimately 
conveyed to the Defendants where any water right ultimately 
presides. It is interesting to note that even in Plaintiff's 
own case Peterson v. Eureka Hill Mining Company, Supra, 
acquisition of the premises upon which the spring exists 
is an essential element. This Court should affirm the 
Trial Court's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. 
DATED March 6, 1980. RESPECTFULLY 
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